Research

Equity in allocating identical objects through reserve categories, under review [pdf]

Improving the Deferred Acceptance with minimal compromise  (with M. Oğuz Afacan, Umut Dur and Arda Gitmez), under review[pdf]

Stability of an allocation of objects (with Murat Yılmaz), Review of Economic Design, special issue in honor of Semih Koray, forthcoming (2022)[pdf]

School choice under partial fairness (with Umut Dur and A. Arda Gitmez), Theoretical Economics, 14, 1309–1346, (2019)[pdf] (For longer version, please click here.)

How (not) to integrate blood subtyping to kidney exchange (with Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver), Journal of Economic Theory, 176, 193 231 (2018). [pdf]

A characterization of the extended serial correspondence (with Eun Jeong Heo), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 59, 102-110 (2015). [pdf]

Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 51, 178-186 (2014). [pdf]

Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 592-618 (2011). [pdf]

The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments, Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2), 475-491 (2010). [pdf]

Random assignment under weak preferences, Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (1), 546-558 (2009). [pdf]

Utility representation of lower separable preferences, Mathematical Social Sciences, 56 (3), 389-394 (2008). [pdf]