

# Defining ‘America’ from a Distance: Local Strategies of the Global in the Middle East

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This article aims to look at three kinds of networks in three different time periods, which spanned the US and the Middle East in order to follow the evolution of particular meanings of terms such as ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘transnational’. Based on historical analysis and fieldwork in Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul, it traces the simultaneous formation of the variants of a particular domestic social class and their cosmopolitan cultural capital. These social classes and their knowledge production emerge from the three American institutions of higher education in the aforementioned cities. Sketching in their activities and discourses the uncertain consolidation of particular knowledge systems as signifiers of a cosmopolitan cultural capital, the article makes the following arguments. First, global networks of elites constitute their distinctions in the local context in terms of their cosmopolitan cultural capital. Second, the ability to make this distinction work depends on whether this cultural capital can be defined in terms that exclude negative connotations. In the case of networks emanating from or with ties to the United States, this means recoding of their identities in terms of a web of relations that covers the entire globe. Third, among the consequences of building such appearances is the creation of a separation between benign cultures and dispassionate intellectual pursuits on the one hand and imperial politics on the other. This separation, although fragile and in constant need of rearticulating, results in the multiple definitions of ‘American’ in the contemporary context.

The first network is made up of the early nineteenth century businessmen and missionaries who travelled to different parts of the world in pursuit of profit or God. In particular, I focus on their activities in the Middle East, which gave birth to historically prestigious institutions of higher education among other things. Three such institutions, still in operation – Boğaziçi University (formerly Robert College), the American University of Beirut (AUB – formerly the Syrian Protestant College) and the American University in Cairo (AUC) – have come to be associated with the good that the American presence in the region could engender. The second network is the Cultural Congress for Freedom, an organization initiated by CIA agents and funded by covert CIA money in the 1950s and 1960s with the objective of organizing anti-Communist progressive intellectuals of Europe as a front against Soviet cultural influence. For that period, the liberal intellectual networks associated with the Congress

were instrumental in creating a rift between American (high) culture and the American government's policies during the Cold War. I use this period, not entirely unrelated to the Middle East, as a case in which such networks of actors define 'culture' and 'politics' separately from one another, precisely by the entanglements between them. I apply these stories to the third network, whose members graduated from the universities created by the first network in the past 30 or so years. Although they represent only a part of the elite in these countries, they play a critical role as brokers between national and global politics. They are notables whose distinctive cultural capitals originate from American institutions, located in a region increasingly associated with opposition to the US. Their continual work at maintaining their local distinctions as cosmopolitans require transnationalizing their origins away from their American connotations. Looking at this strife shows us the simultaneous failures and successes of global networks of knowledge in the Middle East.

In the early twenty-first century a popular question preoccupying media reporting on the Middle East is 'why do they hate us?' More often than not, its answer revolves around 'they hate our way of life'. Scholars who have looked at the origins of American presence suggest that it is necessary to separate contemporary anti-Americanism from the earlier more positive experiences the people of the Middle East had with Protestant missionaries from the United States and the educational institutions they established.<sup>1</sup> As such, experiences with these interactions, which have benefited many in the region over the course of more than a century, cannot be submerged by the kind of unsophisticated antagonisms voiced in the mass media. However, these articulations of a binarism between a benign American enterprise in the region and the current US government policies need also be analyzed.

By the end of the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of American businessmen and Protestant missionaries, dispersed particularly to less advanced regions of the world. Some of them were part of a new wealthy class whose fortunes mainly came from a combination of railroads, steel, coal, and oil investments.<sup>2</sup> The same families and their companies financed philanthropic welfare projects and missionary activities in America and elsewhere. Before the First World War, the United States government did not have many relations with the Ottoman Empire. However this did not necessarily hamper the expansive activities of private American citizens – whether affiliated with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) or not – who were running 450 schools with close to 26,000 students by the end of the First World War.<sup>3</sup> ABCFM's international missionary expenditure, \$40,000 in 1820 alone, had already reached \$200,000 by 1837 and was never below \$300,000 after 1852. Of these sums approximately one-third went to the missionary enterprises in the Middle East.<sup>4</sup> According to Philip Hitti, from 1820 to 1959, American philanthropic expenditure in the Middle East totalled about \$400 million, second only to oil investments.<sup>5</sup> Robert College (RC – later Boğaziçi University) in Istanbul, Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) and the American University in Cairo were established in 1863, 1866 and 1919 by former members of the ABCFM, with the financial support of some of the emerging US corporations of the time. Looking at the web of relations between these actors provides us with an interesting history of how American capitalists' and philanthropists' cultural

pursuits acquired a sense of transnationalism as they moved away from the US. In the following paragraphs, I detail their activities with this in mind.

Among the big American corporations funding a number of philanthropic activities in the Middle East, the most prominent was the Phelps Dodge Corporation. The Dodge family served for decades as the main benefactors of Robert College and the American University of Beirut. The family owned the Phelps Dodge Corporation established by Anson Phelps in 1832 with his two sons-in-law, one of whom was William E. Dodge. It was one of the leading mining corporations of its time, operating in close cooperation with the armaments industries. Anson Phelps had earned his wealth through financing southern plantations, trading their cotton in London and running a ship line. By the 1830s he had major investments in real estate, banking and insurance, mainly based in New York.<sup>6</sup> Both he and William E. Dodge were members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and the American Home Missionary Society, which were active in programmes of assimilation in the Western territories and the South.<sup>7</sup> William E. Dodge and his son David Stuart Dodge were patrons of the AUB. David Stuart Dodge was an instructor in the college and later its business manager in the United States until his death. William E. Dodge's other son, William, also took over the role of being the patron of the university, providing most of the capital for AUB's initial building between 1863 and 1866. In 1884–85 David Stuart Dodge, the President of the Board of Trustees in later years, also provided £4000 for the erection of another building. Further buildings were funded with \$8000 dollars from different members of the Dodge family. William Dodge, long time member and treasurer of the Board of Trustees, left \$20,000 for scholarship purposes in his will in 1883.<sup>8</sup>

William Dodge's grandson Cleveland H. Dodge (1860–1926) organized the Near East Relief in 1915. Between 1915 and 1930 the organization coordinated the distribution of \$1,000,000 worth of relief supplies. Its operations were topped only by the American Red Cross and the American Relief Administration. This organization, later transformed into the Near East Foundation, was considered a major contribution to the establishment and expansion of American philanthropy in the region.<sup>9</sup> Cleveland H. Dodge was also a member and the president of the Robert College Board of Trustees for 17 years. In fact he was the last trustee with a personal wealth sufficient to cover the expenses of RC.<sup>10</sup> Among other members of the family was Olivia Eggleston Phelps Stokes, who was a benefactor of the Constantinople Girls College, later to be merged with Robert College. The son of Cleveland H. Dodge, Bayard Dodge (1880–1972) (married to the daughter of Syrian Protestant College's second president Howard Bliss) became the third president of AUB while his daughter Elizabeth Huntington (married to the vice president of Robert College George Huntington) was a staff member at Robert College.<sup>11</sup> Bayard Dodge's son, David Dodge, served as the thirteenth president of the university in later years of his life before being the first American to be kidnapped in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War. Earlier he had been employed in the US wartime intelligence organization, called the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and worked in ARAMCO and Tapline for 25 years.<sup>12</sup> The entire contribution of the various generations of the family to both colleges is unknown.

There is more to be said about the earlier years of Near East Foundation's relations with three colleges (RC, AUB, and Constantinople Women's College)

during the First World War. The Near East Foundation collected an emergency fund of a little more than \$1,100,000, one-third of which came from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund.<sup>13</sup> In addition, between 1924 and 1940 different divisions of Rockefeller Foundation disbursed \$1,813,000 to various departments of AUB.<sup>14</sup>

Similar networks of railroads and finance, made possible the establishment of the Robert College. Although the Dodge family was involved in Robert College, its main benefactor was Christopher Rhineland Robert (1802–78) who consented to the funding of an independent college in Istanbul after having met the ABCFM missionary Cyrus Hamlin and witnessed the success of the bread mill the latter had set up and run during the Crimean War (1853–56).<sup>15</sup> He was the son of Dr Daniel Robert (1746–1804) who had made a fortune in the West Indies and returned to continue amassing his wealth by purchasing confiscated land from a judge through a private agreement.<sup>16</sup> By the time he returned from the West Indies, the doctor was making around \$25,000 a year, from sources which are not revealed even in his family correspondences.<sup>17</sup> Christopher Robert started off as a shipping clerk and went on to accumulate a large fortune through the New York based firm of Robert and Williams. His business was mainly in New Orleans. He was an importer between 1835 and 1862 and president of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad between 1858 and 1863.<sup>18</sup> This company was established and expanded by leasing lines already developed. Due to its location in anthracite-rich lands, it was also in the business of coal mining with very lucrative results.<sup>19</sup> He gave Robert College, named in his honour, \$296,000 in his lifetime, and left it \$125,000 in his will along with real estate valued at \$40,000.<sup>20</sup>

Another well-known benefactor of Robert College was John Stewart Kennedy. Born in Scotland, he started off as a salesman for the Mossend Iron & Coal Co., influential both in Scotland and in railroad building in the United States. Very quickly he worked his way up the ladder to partnership in Jesup and Co.<sup>21</sup> During the 1830s and 1840s investment flows to railroads were so huge that listings in London and New York stock exchanges grew exponentially and other stock exchanges mushroomed on both sides of the Atlantic. In fact, by 1900 the US railroad listings were the largest group on the New York Stock Exchange.<sup>22</sup> Throughout his life Kennedy remained active in railroad financing and after his retirement he focused on philanthropic enterprises. He was the president of the Robert College Board of Trustees for 14 years. His will included a bequest of \$1.75 million for the college,<sup>23</sup> with which the Engineering School was founded.

Once again it was the private initiative of a missionary formerly associated with the ABCFM and William Bancroft Hill and Elise Weyerhaeuser financial support that made the establishment of AUC possible. Elise Weyerhaeuser came from the Weyerhaeuser family, which owned the largest timber firm in the United States. Starting his business in the mid-nineteenth century, Frederick Weyerhaeuser built a lumber monopoly in the western United States within 40 years. At this time, lumbering was one of the principal businesses in the United States because of the ongoing huge scale of expansion, settlement, and construction activities.<sup>24</sup> After the land titles of Indians were largely eliminated between 1825 and 1855 and Indians were pushed further west or into reservations, the north-west was open for settlements; railroads came and the market for lumber skyrocketed.<sup>25</sup> The families

of Weyerhaeuser and Hill were linked at the end of the nineteenth century when James Hill, the operator of Northern Pacific Railroad, sold Frederick Weyerhaeuser more than three million acres of timberland,<sup>26</sup> which he had acquired from the government as a land grant in 1864.<sup>27</sup> James Hill had bought St Paul and Pacific Railroad from a Dutch investment in 1878. It was this sale that contributed immensely to the growth of Weyerhaeuser's company in the years to come as the land turned out to be one of the richest timber areas on the planet.<sup>28</sup> This sale also began a flood of speculative activity in north-western timber.<sup>29</sup> In the 21st century the company was a major conglomerate that owned one of the largest areas of timberlands in the world, manufactured construction products and cellulose fibres, ran a shipping line and a real estate firm.<sup>30</sup> Frederick Weyerhaeuser's wealth and his rise through monopolistic enterprises has been compared to Rockefeller's.<sup>31</sup> The initial pledge of Hill-Weyerhaeuser was an endowment fund of \$450,000, which they honoured despite the stock market crash in 1929.<sup>32</sup>

The initial objective of all missionary enterprises in the region and elsewhere was spreading Protestantism. However the former missionaries associated with these institutions as well as others soon gave up their objectives of conversion.<sup>33</sup> In fact, Howard Bliss, the second president of the Syrian Protestant College, in 'The Modern Missionary',<sup>34</sup> emphasized that the goal of the new generation of missionaries should be to work for local development through mutual understanding of cultures.<sup>35</sup> In this article, published in 1920, he argued that missionaries as well as the SPC needed to educate open-minded and modern young men to serve their regions. This articulation anticipated the period between the two world wars and the vision of a world 'united by peace, economic capitalism, and what is now called "human rights"'.<sup>36</sup> The merchants, the philanthropists, and the missionaries were the first 'internationalists'.<sup>37</sup> For them, America and their American identities symbolized a transnational modernity. These links also suggested the gradual entanglement of private business profits in the US and elsewhere, their philanthropic activities in and outside the country, the changes in educational desires partly in response to shifts in developmental models emanating from where the philanthropy was coming. They also pointed to the multiplicity of actors that went into the production of local networks of transnationalized elites far away from the US. These relations were the beginnings of a century-long transformation of knowledge production and consumption, originating in the expansion of business interests.

The facilitating role of the US government in these interests increased and took on different roles over time. When the US government joined the First World War, it began to take a more centralized interest in spreading American culture and advocating ideas of political and economic liberalism. Rosenberg situates this liberal developmentalist ideology in the belief that the American model could be repeated anywhere in the world, as long as faith in private enterprise was maintained, the market for goods, ideas and information were kept open on an international scale, and the role of the (US) government in protecting and promoting these premises was accepted.<sup>38</sup> While prior to the First World War commercial and missionary activities in different locations had to work hand in hand, now government agencies joined them and began to advocate notions of professional expertise as a paternalist solution to socioeconomic and political problems abroad.<sup>39</sup> Throughout the war, governmental and private relief agencies also contributed to further pushing the idea

of the efficiency of progressive expertise.<sup>40</sup> These exchanges and other connections detailed below show us a gradual decoupling of a particular knowledge production and the government policies, which actually contributed to them.

During the First World War, because of lack of prior experience in the Middle East, the US government began to form ad hoc ties with the missionaries, instructors, and professors associated with Robert College and the American University in Beirut. These were moments of reciprocity between philanthropy, power, and knowledge. One of the most eminent connections was the friendship between Cleveland H. Dodge and Woodrow Wilson. Although Dodge refused to be officially part of the government, his connections with Wilson always provided him with the ability to influence the US policy regarding the region.<sup>41</sup> For instance, the fact that the United States did not directly declare war on Turkey allowed the American schools to go on operating. This was made possible by the Bulgarian ambassador to Washington, DC, who was also a graduate of Robert College, and Cleveland H. Dodge. After these two met, Dodge went to Washington and explained their predicament to Woodrow Wilson, who limited the official parameters of the US war involvement to Italy and Germany.<sup>42</sup> These interconnections helped in other ways as well. For instance, in 1917 Mary Patrick Mills, the president of the Women's College, was able to return to Istanbul from the US, passing through five countries at war with one another, obtaining visas with difficulty, once with the help of Allen Dulles, then through the US consulate in Vienna.<sup>43</sup> Dulles was to preside over, in the later years, the Near East College Association, which constituted of RC, AUB, and Sofia College, before becoming the head of the CIA.

Another connection could be seen in the friendship between Howard Bliss, the second president of AUB, father-in-law of the third president, Bayard Dodge, and Theodore Roosevelt, the president of the United States between 1901 and 1909. Partly through Roosevelt's intervention, it was possible to obtain official recognition from the Sublime Porte of the rights and properties of the colleges and the American mission operations in Turkey. Bliss was also called to Paris for the Peace Conference in 1919. During the proceedings, he argued that the people of the region should be able to voice whose mandate they wanted, and he called for an international investigation to be carried out in the region. This launched a heated debate between the French, who wanted the mandate over Syria, and American missionaries, who advocated an American mandate for varying parts of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>44</sup> In the end it became a sole American investigation commission headed by Charles Crane and Henry King. Seven members of the nine-person committee had relations with the Protestant missionaries in the Near East.<sup>45</sup> Charles Crane was also a trustee of Robert College. He was a Chicago millionaire whose father had amassed his wealth in manufacturing toilet bowl fittings. Crane was one of the biggest contributors to Wilson's 1912 election campaign. In later years he also financed the first oil explorations in Yemen and worked with Jack Philby, who was a British intelligence officer and a close adviser to Ibn Saud, to start oil explorations in Saudi Arabia.<sup>46</sup>

Caleb Gates, the president of Robert College, was also at the conference as an unofficial advisor to Admiral Bristol. His request that American schools and hospitals in Turkey should continue their work as before was granted. Incidentally, the first Turkish graduate of the college, Hüseyin Pektaş, served as secretary and translator to the head of the Turkish delegation at Mudanya and Lausanne

conferences.<sup>47</sup> Despite the fact that the US Congress was never part of the Lausanne peace treaty, the American schools continued to operate under the rules agreed with other participants to the conference.<sup>48</sup>

The founders of these institutions as well as the philanthropists who helped them in their work usually discussed the impact of the wide gamut of philanthropic activities during the nineteenth and early twentieth century in terms of the opportunities for the formation of national leadership.<sup>49</sup> The educators also saw in their students the potential for a better future in a region, which they presented to their American audiences as riven with violence, disruptive communalism, and lack of education. They were happy to see their students, whose countries were at war with each other, coexist peacefully.<sup>50</sup> Memoirs noted the contrast between popular perceptions of punishments from God and the scientific explanations prevailing among social groups from these colleges.<sup>51</sup> These examples were frequently used to show that this generation of potential leaders were going to derive the best of both worlds: Western civilization with its ideas of liberalism, scientific objectivism, and belief in the progress of the individual as well as nationalist aspirations encouraging them to use their exceptional skills so that their countries would catch up with the West. The language of modernity 'help[ed] to conquer and assimilate and transform more, even than battle and treaties'.<sup>52</sup> This language of modernity was coming from American Protestants but it was also acquiring an aura of a transnational commonsense. The institutions were participating in the gradual formation of international standards for education.

It is harder to assess what the philanthropist businessmen and women might have had in mind. They wrote extensively about their activities and the kinds of men and women they wanted to educate. Therefore, one explanation is the desire on the part of these people to share their wealth and spread modernity. However, Vitalis also makes a compelling argument when he discusses welfare efforts and paternalistic education as two mechanisms through which the same business elite alleviated the potential strengthening of labour unions in the south of America.<sup>53</sup> It would be worthwhile to look at these philanthropic efforts to see if there were similarities in the educational standards employed to train a managerial class that could help in the process of minimizing possible labour tensions in the oil business. For the early twentieth century we, at least, have evidence of the ways in which these men and women participated in the US foreign policy in the region. Commenting on the debate between altruism and imperialism, Doumato emphasizes the difficulty of retaining such clear-cut dualities when changes over time in the individual missionaries' and their supporters' perceptions and activities are taken into consideration.<sup>54</sup>

So what do we learn from this survey of connections? It is only in these changes and entanglements that we can capture the works that went into producing shifting notions of global modernities. First, protecting missionary institutions in the Near East did require a lot of work and much of this was conducted in political circles. Second, however, the same work by political actors and missionaries produced a representation of their activities with a focus on their humanitarian aspects. Significantly, they appeared not to have anything to do with politics, but their beneficiaries occasionally needed political protection. At the same time, both the American educators and those that passed through these institutions could be

resources of expertise for understanding and developing the region to reach Western models of modernity. Ultimately the notions of internationalism and global standards for education could be sustained only through the continued intervention on the part of numerous actors. This myriad web of relations produced and sustained some of the most prestigious schools in the region. The multifarious activities of the same networks allowed for the spread of the idea of a benevolent expertise about education, modernity, etc., emanating from the private citizens of the US, disentangling the American presence in the region from political and economic objectives. Yet politics was always there.

After the Second World War, the US intervention in reorganizing and regulating the world economy intensified, coinciding with the decline of pre-war colonial empires and the gradual restructuring of global politics<sup>55</sup> in terms of the antagonism between the United States and the USSR. Some of the battles were fought in the cultural sphere. Beginning with the establishment of the Division of Cultural Relations within the State Department in 1938, 'culture' began to be increasingly approached as a foreign policy tool. Among its activities were official overseas student and faculty exchanges, support of American schools abroad, building libraries, and facilitating the distribution of American films and broadcasts.<sup>56</sup> Sanctioned by the National Security Directive-68, issued in 1950, the government's budget of \$34 million for psychological warfare had already quadrupled by 1952.<sup>57</sup> Additionally, in 1954, during Eisenhower's presidency, when Allen Dulles was head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Allen Dulles' brother John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State, an 'Emergency Fund for International Affairs' to finance cultural exports was approved.<sup>58</sup> Finally, the newly established CIA was to coordinate military and diplomatic intelligence as well as carry out 'services of common concern' and 'such other functions and duties'.<sup>59</sup>

Among these 'services and common concerns' was the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).<sup>60</sup> Much of its finances came from a discretionary fund embedded in the Marshall Plan, which provided the CIA with around \$200 million a year.<sup>61</sup> Beginning in Europe, it expanded to Latin America, Africa, the Far East and the Middle East, and was operative from 1950 to 1967. The Congress recruited and promoted activities for networks of individuals from these regions, revolted by the atrocities committed in Stalin's Soviet Union but not readily accepting American alternatives for socioeconomic organization. Over the course of two decades the CCF ran activities ranging from organizing international conferences and art exhibitions to publishing numerous subtly pro-American magazines; from supporting intellectuals defecting from the Communist bloc to coordinating protests against Soviet human rights violations. CCF also utilized a number of shadow non-profit organizations for the purpose of concealing the real source of the activities of the congress.<sup>62</sup> Also, foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, and Mellon became frequent conduits of these CIA programmes and funding through exchanges of directors, common memberships in national committees, common social circles and governmental postings.<sup>63</sup> At its highest point, Congress for Cultural Freedom owned more than 20 magazines on five continents, employed 208 people and spent annually more than \$2 million, fully compensated by the CIA.<sup>64</sup>

The East Coast elite who ran these programmes at the CIA had two main aims – not always compatible and not even carried out by people with identical ideologies. Fighting against the possible expansion of Soviet influence in Europe was the obvious purpose. In this sense the cultural programmes were geared towards galvanizing anti-communism among left and right wing intellectuals with potential impact on their societies. There was also the objective of reducing anti-Americanism among such intellectual groups especially in Europe. The Frankfurt School, for instance, saw in the export of American cultural and consumer products a cessation of high culture as an end in itself and its transformation into a propaganda tool.<sup>65</sup> The elite corps of the International Organizations Division at the CIA feared precisely this and set out in these two decades to convince their equally elite and intellectual audiences around the world of the existence of a Western high culture – overriding political ideologies – which they all shared and to which American artists, writers, and intellectuals were making valuable contributions. The power of this work came not because of its connections to the United States, but rather the seemingly transnational associations on which it thrived. The progressive artists, writers, and intellectuals who connected with each other through the CCF contributed ironically, to shaping a notion of transnationalism associated with ideas which in fact were emanating from the US government and its secret service officials. The Cultural Congress for Freedom symbolized the anxious efforts of the US government to represent the United States in a particular way and to recode some of the government's Cold War driven interests in transnational terms. This was done through the strategically organized activities of actors associated with the US government as well as elite circles of the East Coast establishment. Although Americanization continued to have negative connotations, and anti-American intellectuals were widespread in Europe and elsewhere, such 'cultural' organizations contributed to the creation of a separation between the ideas of a liberal US culture and questionable US government policies.

In the same period, the US was gradually replacing the UK as the predominant power in the Middle East. On the cultural front, the historical rise of local networks of elites, graduating from the American institutions in the region, to pedestals of cosmopolitanism, leadership, and expertise came into being in these larger contexts where battles for the definitions and values of such characteristics were being fought. Although not established by the United States directly, each of these universities received substantial funds in the Cold War period from the US government and private foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller for extended periods of time. This assistance was part of larger packages to Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt coming from the US. Between 1951 and 1960 the Ford Foundation made a total of \$10 million grants to the Middle East out of a total of \$80 million to the Third World.<sup>66</sup> Another such initiative was the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In 1954 the US Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, Public Law (PL) 480 in part to dispose of surplus agricultural products. To mitigate the impact of the oligopolistic structure of the grain market in the US on small farmers, the US state had already introduced subsidies and price supports. The new act authorized the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to countries for local currency.

The receipts for these products were used by the US government to sponsor aid programmes in that particular country. Between 1955 and 1992, PL 480 would be tremendously influential in US relations with Egypt as well as Turkey, Israel, and Jordan in the region. These funds were significant in the survival of these institutions, and the networks they gave rise to during and after the Cold War.

The case of Turkey, for instance, reveals a tension between the magnitude of the disbursements and potential accusations of politicization, which different actors attempted to forestall with their publicized statements. After the Second World War the budding Turkish bourgeoisie's demands for a market-oriented economy and the Western orientation of the bureaucracy directed the choice of the American camp in the ensuing Cold War. The period was marked by increased American aid. In Istanbul, the financial situation of Robert College improved as the US government began taking an interest, beginning with the funding of several professorships and student scholarships through Fulbright.<sup>67</sup> During the 1950s, funds solicited by RC from foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford totalled at least \$1,180,000.<sup>68</sup> In 1961 the Middle East Survey Commission wrote a report on RC for the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) of the US government, which in that year provided \$270,000 for dormitory building and faculty housing.<sup>69</sup> The same commission, along with RC, was also surveying AUB and AUC. This report put the funds RC received from the US government in the 1955–60 period, including those from ICA and PL 480, to a total of \$4.5 million. They suggested that the institution needed an additional \$7 million for capital development. In their justification, they wrote:

Both [men's and women's colleges] have, without question, contributed substantially to the quality of leadership in Turkey out of all proportion to the number of their graduates . . .

Turkey has shown its great friendship for the West and interest in the Western democratic way of life. This makes it especially important and appropriate that Robert College should continue to thrive as an important channel of communication between the United States and Turkey.<sup>70</sup>

In this excerpt, there were two expectations that the Commission emphasized. First, Robert College graduates were expected to serve a significant purpose by building amiable bridges between the United States and Turkey. The writers also stressed the institution's ability to form channels of communication and knowledge transfer. Warning against the fear of control using government funds might create; the Commission suggested the appropriation of these funds for purposes such as building and special research projects. During the 1960–61 academic year the college continued to receive aid from the US government under PL 480 and MSA (Mutual Security Act)/USAID.<sup>71</sup>

The following academic year Robert College celebrated its one hundredth anniversary. This coincided with the announcement that USAID was going to cover the operating expenses and an additional \$875,000 would be disbursed via PL 480. The president of the Turkish Republic, Cemal Gürsel, congratulated Robert College in the following words:

Robert College is the first ambassador of goodwill sent abroad by the United States of America. In the hundred years of its existence, this institution has proved that, in spite of many wars and all sorts of changes in political regimes, cooperation among nations can continue in the fields of culture, education, and science.<sup>72</sup>

The president of Turkey portrayed this knowledge production and transfer through RC as outside politics, when he drew the contrast between political ruptures and the continuity of these institutions. He chose not to dwell on the fact that USAID was funded by the US government. Politics continued to play a role: In 1965, the US government asked for a security clearance for faculty, whose salaries were paid from USAID funds. At that time, USAID was providing \$2.2 million a year to the college. The announcement of this requirement turned into a bitter conflict between the board and the faculty, which signed a petition requesting the repeal of the requirement. Further correspondence with the Foreign Relations Committee and USAID revealed that a similar incident had occurred in AUB in the past and the conflict was resolved with a temporary presidential waiver, which implicitly became permanent. The same solution was implemented in Istanbul.<sup>73</sup> The aid from the US government to Robert College totalled \$18,000,000 between 1964 and 1970. This meant that USAID underwrote half of RC's operating budget.

The funding of AUB in Lebanon also contributed to the strength and fame of the institution in educating the regional elite. When in 1946 French troops pulled out of Lebanon, the future of the country became the topic of intense debate between those groups in Lebanon who advocated economic liberalism, and those who called for industrial investments, economic protection and closer cooperation with the Arab east. The former group won out. Point Four of the Truman programme of 1949 gave further impetus to this development, gradually turning Beirut into a centre of commerce, finance, tourism, education, and medicine for the entire region.<sup>74</sup> This reorganization of Beirut as a regional centre of culture and education benefited AUB's popularity and rising prestige immensely. During the 1950s, two consecutive grants from the Ford Foundation totalling \$1,000,000 made possible the establishment of the College of Agriculture. The State Department also supported this college with an additional \$116,000.<sup>75</sup> Another Ford grant enabled the founding of an Institute of Economic Research. Rockefeller supported the expansion of the College of Arts and Sciences in the field of Arabic Studies, with a three-year grant in 1948. Additional funds at the end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s to the amount of \$1,500,000 from the Ford Foundation and \$5,000,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation covered operating expenses and were used in the Arts and Sciences programmes.<sup>76</sup>

Also, starting in 1951, the Point Four programme began sponsoring students from various countries in the Middle East and North Africa to be educated at AUB. These grants were steadily expanded and by 1954–55 there were between 303 and 405 students with Point Four scholarships.<sup>77</sup> Between 1954 and 1971 the US government grants and contracts increased from 29 per cent of the university income to 61.9 per cent. This meant \$670,726 in 1953–54 and \$7,184,464 in 1970–71. During the same period, studies showed that student contribution to the university budget in terms of percentage remained roughly the same, experiencing a decline from 21 per cent in

1953–54 to 18 per cent in 1970–71. In numerical terms this meant \$488,303 in 1953–54 and \$2,087,822 in 1970–71.<sup>78</sup> These funds were part of a general increase in American influence in Lebanon. ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) and the Iraq Petroleum Company (majority of whose shares was owned by the British; it was nationalized in the 1970s) owned and operated pipelines and oil shipping terminals in Lebanon; all of the major US banks and brokerage houses had branches located in Beirut in conjunction with the oil-based capital market; and US private employers possessed significant shares in Middle East Airlines and Trans Mediterranean Airways.<sup>79</sup>

In Egypt, the periodic tensions between the Egyptian and the US governments had their impact on AUC but the institution acquired a sense of detachment from US policies. During the Second World War was also a period in which closer association with the American government began. Several of the university faculty worked with the US government.<sup>80</sup> Wendell Cleland and George Rentz worked in the Office of War Information and William Eddy directed the Department of State's Cultural Relations Division as well as the English Department at AUC. In later years he worked as an undercover CIA agent in ARAMCO. He was also the grandson and son of missionaries who worked in Syria. As the US minister to Saudi Arabia, he was the interpreter during the 1945 meeting between Franklin Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud.<sup>81</sup> Cleland proposed that the university applied for funding from the State Department, which was already assisting Robert College and the American University of Beirut through the Near East College Association. This instigated debates about the implications of having institutionalized links with the American government. The university council decided to solicit such funds only in cases when possible dangers were 'fully guarded against'.<sup>82</sup> Murphy, the American University in Cairo, p. 51. After this decision, beginning in 1944, the State Department funded a series of small projects including purchasing of books for the library, visiting scholarships, and advanced studies for AUC graduates in the US. In 1945, the Board of Trustees ruled against accepting federal funds although the Board consented to individual proposals such as these projects.

Even though, after the Suez crisis, US–Egypt relations became tense, the US became the main source of food aid for Egypt in the 1960s through the Food for Peace Program. The receipts of this programme were used by the US government to sponsor aid programmes in Egypt. By 1957 this deposit had already grown to 6,700,000 Egyptian pounds.<sup>83</sup> After Eisenhower gave a speech in May 1957 encouraging US schools abroad to help create a 'more peaceful and prosperous world' and 'provide a great two-way avenue of communications', the US president was authorized to use up to \$10 million to assist schools and libraries founded and sponsored by the US citizens. The amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1957 Section 400 that made this possible was primarily introduced for AUB and RC, but Eisenhower also signed an amendment allowing the utilization of such foreign currency accounts.<sup>84</sup> Around the same time, the Ford Foundation approved a grant of \$335,000.<sup>85</sup> As relations between Washington and Cairo began improving in late 1958, the International Cooperation Administration made available \$500,000 for AUC and its director recommended applying for PL 480 funds. The AUC's request for a total of \$1,000,000 to be disbursed in Egyptian pounds was approved.<sup>86</sup>

An agreement was signed with the Egyptian government to train 25 officials of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration annually. The Ford Foundation extended grants to bolster the management programme.<sup>87</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s close to \$400,000 came to the AUC from the Ford Foundation.<sup>88</sup> In the 1960s, aid also helped in the purchase of additional land and construction projects. Between 1959 and 1966, US government aid amounted to close to 4.5 million dollars in Egyptian pounds and \$1,623,451.<sup>89</sup> In 1963 an article in *The Journal of Higher Education* described aptly how universities like AUC might be more beneficial than exchange programmes and Peace Corps initiated in the Cold War period:

Educational programs for developing countries are admirable if the roots of incentive are nourished and tended by the people of such nations, but too often they benefit only the individuals concerned...[Upon return] he may have become so accustomed to Western living that he is psychologically out of step with his home country. For these reasons it is appropriate to take a look at foreign education and see how aid can be made more effective in the American institutions that have been established abroad.

...In a country as socialistic as the United Arab Republic, oriented economically and in foreign policy toward the communistic bloc, the educational freedom the American University in Cairo enjoys is nothing short of remarkable and should hearten us in our endeavor to construct a program of educational aid that will truly implement the ideals of international understanding and world peace.<sup>90</sup>

After the 1967 war, aid from the US continued. The Ford Foundation gave emergency aid of \$200,000. The United States government also contributed to an AUC grant of \$1,000,000 in Egyptian pounds and \$200,000 in US dollars. Furthermore, private American companies granted another \$75,000. Because there were many students from areas occupied by Israel during the war, Near East Emergency Donations announced they were providing \$75,000 for displaced students.<sup>91</sup> In 1971 USAID paid \$800,000 to fund the Social Research Council's study of overpopulation in Egypt.<sup>92</sup> The grants authorized by the American Schools and Hospitals programme grew from \$4.3 million in 1959 to \$13.5 million a year during the 1960s and to \$30 million by 1970. The largest sums from this fund traditionally accrued to Robert College, the American University of Beirut and Project Hope a hospital ship, equipped to provide education and care in less developed countries.<sup>93</sup> Although relations between Egypt and the West had cooled again after the war, in 1969 the US Secretary of State supported the establishment of the Egyptian Pound Investment Fund for AUC and USAID granted the university an endowment of 25 million Egyptian pounds –although with the provision that the money could not be invested until the sequestration came to an end. This happened in 1975 and AUC began using the fund.

In the 1970s, however, official US aid to all institutions began declining for a variety of reasons. As the Cold War was coming to its ideological end and because the Vietnam War had drained the treasury in the United States, USAID began reducing its budget. There was increasing congressional criticism that the American

Schools and Hospitals Abroad programme had become a ‘grab bag, a fund for rescuing schools and hospitals in financial difficulties’.<sup>94</sup> The threat of nationalization of Robert College in Turkey and civil war in Lebanon added to the growing reluctance of the US Congress to approve funding. After Sadat’s *Infatih* policies took effect there were numerous American institutions in Egypt, competing for the same resources.<sup>95</sup> As a result, USAID funding decreased for AUC and AUB while it gradually came to a halt when RC was nationalized under the name Boğaziçi University.

In short, during the Cold War years multiple projects (beyond the institutions discussed) coincided to make a hesitant transition from American politics to transnational intellectual knowledge. These institutions, too, contributed to these multiple, simultaneous activities. In their case, they became recognized as the best educational institutions in the region, guided by liberal principles first introduced by missionary networks and later supported by US government funds. Anyone – administrator, professor, or graduate – in the current context would rightly reject any allusion to possible intellectual boundaries such financial assistance might have caused. Certainly, these links do not attest to conspiracy theories or, for that matter, ‘Americanization’ in the midst of Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul. What makes them remarkable is the way they fit into a transnational history of the era. Cultural transformations taking place simultaneously contributed to an analytical separation between knowledge and ideology, and culture and politics. Yet, these dualities could only be maintained by the active participation and support of a combination of government, business, and intellectual interests – sometimes coinciding and sometimes conflicting – pursuing their goals simultaneously through a number of educational and cultural institutions.

In the final section I analyze these separations in the hesitant self-definitions of social groups who have been educated in these American institutions in the last 30 or so years. Members of these networks usually described their roles in their societies in terms of their simultaneous connections to the Western/American world and the countries in which they continued to reside. They wanted to be seen as the cosmopolitan elite whose cultural experiences enabled them to claim transnational positions in the local context: hence their self-acclaimed expertise in development, non-governmental organizations, finance as well as local operations of a number of multinational institutions and companies. On the other hand American Policies in the Middle East have been jeopardizing this self-definition. Dilemmas regarding what the US means and how US cultural capital relates to it have gained precedence. Dezalay and Garth coin the term ‘international strategies’ in understanding the processes through which particular social groups acquire positions of influence in their home countries, based on their – particularly educational – experiences in the US.<sup>96</sup> This notion captures how having access to particular knowledge systems outside the national context enables legitimacy and power in the domestic sphere. However it does not deal with the centrality of defining ‘international’ outside US politics.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the escalating American intervention in the region made this a persistent issue on the minds especially of graduates from Cairo and Beirut, where the universities retained the ‘American’ in

their names. As for Boğaziçi, although it was now a public university, several people I met had either attended American high schools, or continued to draw out the American roots of the university in emphasizing its distinction from other similar local institutions or had done graduate studies in the United States. How do international strategies work when they require constant erasure of particular ties? Specifically, what contributes to the guarding of this erasure? What are the results in terms of our understanding of being transnational?

In the 1970s, prior to the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, the AUB campus was a hub of all sorts of political activities. Among them were the leftist and pro-Palestinian student groups who constantly protested against American policies regarding Palestine. Over the years the university did everything possible to distance itself from American policies on the Arab–Israeli conflict. In fact, for several years to come, its professors and administrators spoke against these policies.<sup>97</sup> One of the student leaders of the time explained his political and intellectual frustration in the following words:

Politically my generation was against the American policies, especially on the Arab–Israeli, Palestinian–Israeli issue. And surely we were always demonstrating against the American policies, etc. Now the idea of a democracy, the idea of respecting the opinions of others really captured our imaginations. Because, you know, this institution...this American institution is ultimately a good institution. And the ideas of the founding fathers of AUB were obviously as opposed to the politics of the [US] administration. We were in a sense in a schizophrenic situation whereby we did not appreciate the policies of the American administration and at the same time we were greatly appreciative of their educational system, of their values as far as debates and liberties are concerned. So it was unsettling.<sup>98</sup>

Accordingly, they were exercising their right to protest. They were socialized in these very institutions into forming critical opinions and voicing them. My informant went on to tell me about his recent trip to the US when he had the chance to visit the Supreme Court, meeting the highest judges in the system. 'It's a great system by any standards. The problem is the politics...basically the executives, not the legal system', he concluded. 'America always gives you these two conflicting impressions: an impression of how great it could be and, at the same time, how miserable its politics can be.'<sup>99</sup> This dilemma reflected the gradual decoupling of a particular notion of politics and a knowledge production outside of it.

Colonna argues that one of the chief successes of the French missionary education system in Algeria was to create in the minds of its graduates a split between what *ideal* France was and the everyday practices of colonialism that viciously contradicted this ideal. As a result, those who graduated from these missionary institutions were able to carry out translation, representation, and interlocution tasks.<sup>100</sup> In the current context, similar rifts between an idealized American culture and US politics pointed to more than successful activities of translation and interlocution. In protesting against the US politics, justified in terms of liberal notions of freedom of speech, members of these social groups attested to a higher culture that existed

outside the US, as part of these institutions. Bhabha offers the notion of mimicry in order to explain the tension that persists between the colonizing class and the indigenous upper class educated in foreign missionary schools. He argues that this particular kind of education leads to the formation of a people that had characteristic similarities with the white ruling class, but they could never be quite the same.<sup>101</sup> In this case, it was a positive thing not to be quite the same. The difference allowed the owners of this educational capital to avoid being associated with American politics. It was based on a moral boundary around liberal values, uncontaminated by politics, and created the effect of a distinction between American politics and American culture. Because these graduates had access to a variety of intellectual traditions, they were able to pick and choose what was best about these Western cultures. They had internalized the liberal cultures of the US, but they did not see themselves becoming Americanized.

As such their cultural capital could also be formulated in cosmopolitan or global terms. These social groups usually based their distinctions in the local context on their cosmopolitanism and naturalized access to global knowledge schemes. These knowledge schemes were globalized precisely because they could surmount local prejudices and political mishaps (as in the case of the United States). They could be the bridges bringing contact between desirable Western cultures and their own. The presence of these three institutions in Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul was frequently described in terms of bridges between the East and the West. A recent institutional self-study of AUB included a debate around whether the new mission statement should include a sentence on the role of bridging the West and the East.<sup>102</sup> In a speech Al Gore gave at the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo on the occasion of a special gathering for AUC in 1995, he 'praised the university for being a "bridge between cultures" during its 75 years of service to Egypt and the region'.<sup>103</sup> The Middle East Survey Commission had already written in May 1961 that Robert College was a 'channel of communication'.<sup>104</sup> Accordingly, the graduates today described their position as in between the West and their local realities, with equal access to both. They were possessors of a global culture that combined the best of each knowledge system. But this was not an innovation; it harked back to a century-old set of traditions established through the work of a variety of networks in defining what transnational knowledge and progress meant.

One of the businessmen I met in Egypt, who had graduated from AUC, was frequently involved in organizing management seminars for the business community in Cairo. 'There is something missing in Egypt', he said to me one day. 'There is still a gap between the Egyptian way of thinking and the way the world is going, globalization if we may call it. People recognize it but they just don't know how to bridge this gap. If I may be of help in this endeavor, I'll be very happy'.<sup>105</sup> His words captured the idea of international strategies, whereby access to international knowledge systems enabled legitimacy and a place of one's own in the domestic sphere. The cultural capital made possible through attendance in American educational systems was, in the first step, dissociated from negative connotations of the US politics, giving rise to multiple definitions of what America meant. In the second step, this dissociated knowledge was globalized, that is, made to stand for a cosmopolitan cultural capital that was placeless, originless, standing outside politics and current events. Talking about

her children, a Turkish graduate described her expectations of a seamless world for their future.

I want [my son] to have the kind of education that would make him a global citizen . . . I would like him to have the kind of background and personality that would enable him to adapt to any place in the world, live, work and form a social circle there . . . so that he is someone actively part of a global network, unrestricted with the borders of Turkey. . . . I am trying to raise him so that he can earn his living anywhere in the world, be happy anywhere in the world –like a global citizen.<sup>106</sup>

In the words of this person with several years of international experience behind her, the idea of global citizenship meant being comfortable in as many settings as possible, including – and especially – the West. Earlier literature on globalization tends to focus on the interactions between fluid, border-crossing landscapes of international media, cultural products, informational flows<sup>107</sup> and their travelling subjects either in the form of professional globe trotters, tourists or migrants, or those whose imaginations as social practices place them on maps beyond their contemporary dwelling places.<sup>108</sup> However, recent anthropological studies aiming to develop an ethnography of these new global landscapes point to how the same processes also produce racialized, gendered bodies and subjects.<sup>109</sup> These studies point to the simultaneous production of ‘global citizens’ and their ‘global others’. They also show that there is not necessarily a smooth transition from one category to the other.

Since 11 September 2001 wars against Iraq and Afghanistan have embittered societies in several predominantly Muslim countries. Furthermore, heightened security measures at the borders of those states, which participated in or supported these wars, became a pronounced reality. As far as travel to the United States was concerned, the annual number of H-1B visas issued fell to 65,000 in 2003 from 195,000 in 2001. By 2003 the number of refugees allowed to enter the country was at a 25 year record low.<sup>110</sup> Hence travel became harder, strategically (in terms of fulfilling visa requirements, and the prolonged visa application processes) and emotionally (because of the increased possibility of being the target of often humiliating racial profiling at the borders as well as inside these countries). This was especially the case for men with particular appearances (often called ‘Middle Eastern’) who, more often than not, seemed to be harassed, stopped and searched in airports.<sup>111</sup> These social groups were now bundled with ‘terrorists’ because they ‘looked’ a particular way. Their activities, inside and outside their countries, became targets of scrutiny especially if they were unfortunate enough to have names associated with famous figures or if they had any connections to suspect groups. For instance, in 2003 the Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora was advised by the US Consulate in Beirut against travelling to the United States although he had a valid visa. He was put on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism because he had made a donation to Al-Mabarrat Islamic Charity Society at a fast-breaking meal during the month of Ramadan in 2000.<sup>112</sup> Robert Fisk wrote about this episode in the following words: ‘So the Prime Minister – trained in the US as an economist, no more

true-blue supporter of American values can you find – still cannot apparently fly to New York.’<sup>113</sup>

Ayman, a young executive in Cairo, had spent considerable amounts of time outside Egypt as an American Field Service student in the United States as well as his childhood in an American compound in Saudi Arabia where his father was employed. In all of our conversations he described himself as a global citizen who felt closer to members of his generation outside Egypt than inside. However, at this point in time he was not sure about living in the West.

I was in London about a year ago. And I was very thoroughly searched at the airport. It’s not nice, you know. I was like; ‘go ahead. I have nothing to hide.’ If you want me to take off my clothes, I don’t care. But it is hard. My brother’s wife is Egyptian but she has the French nationality and they live in London. When they travel together and they go back to London, she is in and out in two minutes while he waits in the queue for an hour just because he has the Egyptian passport. I mean I know that they’ve been through hell: what happened on 9/11 is scary for any country, not just the United States but I hope that they understand that, you know, not everybody in the Arab countries are terrorists.<sup>114</sup>

The sentiment he voiced was an objection to this depiction of Middle East societies as those breeding terrorists. He carefully stated that he could see both sides, but was also disappointed that this subtlety was lost when he was travelling. And it was true, the difficulties of having an Egyptian passport had increased tremendously. For instance, Egyptian citizens deported from the United States reached a record high after 9/11 from tens to close to 300 annually.<sup>115</sup> A visa application to the US in Cairo took an average of close to two months,<sup>116</sup> with cases I witnessed extending far beyond that average. So notions and practices of global bridges were cracking under the weight of politics. Or it could also be said that politics has been part of the construction of such ideas and images to begin with.

In both Egypt and Lebanon I sat in classes on globalization and national development, following the unravelling of a set of concerns by students and their professors about how they could induce change in their countries and how they could become winning partners in processes of economic globalization. In some of these discussions, the young members of these networks articulated notions such as development, change, resistance to change, and traditionalism. However their dilemmas regarding the politicized nature of these seemingly technical concepts also surfaced in their exchanges.

Before one such seminar began the professor began chatting with the American exchange student about American football. Nobody (including me) was paying attention to what he was saying until he concluded a sentence with ‘although America is the greatest country in the world’. Everyone stopped; several people exclaimed, ‘what?’ The professor, in his calm voice continued to say that it was a pretty awful experience to live in Germany. He added, ‘It is great to live in the US. Yes, if you are in Germany and you are unemployed, you get subsidies. But I don’t want to be unemployed anyway. In the US you have a great deal of personal freedom.’ He then added that what he most enjoyed about the US was the fact that one could meet people from all over the world. One student retorted that it was the

same in Europe: London, Paris; that in fact any big city in the world would be the same. Another claimed that he was biased. A third attempted to reconcile the views by saying that both Germany and the US were great; but Germany had the additional advantage of having a history. Someone jokingly asked, 'American cars are better?!' The professor shrugged in response and said that Germany did not have a history. Students were even more perplexed: 'What do you mean Germany does not have a history? History comes from Europe!' One shouted from the back of the class to attract attention: 'Sir, can you define myth? Is there only the American dream?' The professor conceded at that point but not without a final comment: 'Ok, if you look at classical music, you are right. But look at contemporary culture, all of it is coming from the US.' Someone shouted, 'American cars are the worst!' The clamour went on for a while until he asked the class whether they had done the readings. Finally there was silence and the class began.<sup>117</sup>

This exchange was fascinating because the students competed with each other transforming Germany into everything that the US could not stand for and valorizing it as such. Their surprise at the blunt remark by the professor that America was the greatest country in the world reflected a bigger dilemma. In yet another class on global political economy a student contemplated on this predicament. After a debate on the benefits and costs of multinational companies entering Egypt, the floor was open to discussion. One student remarked: 'There was the employment fair last week and most of the companies that had stands were MNCs [multinational companies]. Our dreams for our lives, for Egypt are limited to selling Coca Cola. It is sad.' There was silence for a while until the professor called on one of the students: 'What do you think? Are you going to work in an MNC?' She shrugged with a smile, 'Of course!' The class broke into laughter.<sup>118</sup>

These social groups were recruited as global experts in their countries and as native informants who had the necessary language skills. By these language skills I mean not only an ability to speak excellent English but also a kind of familiarity with particular discourses that came from being associated with them from an early age. On the other hand, the events that have I laid out revealed the underlying tensions. The same global networks whose membership they claimed might disappointingly emphasize their racial, religious, national subjectivities and categorize them as the 'others' of global networks. Such experiences raised questions about their place in the world, their national identities and cultural capitals.

In one of my interviews in the summer of 2002, an administrator at AUB described the school's alumni in the following words: 'They are not typical Middle Easterners and they are not Europeans. They are in between.' This in-betweenness was also reflected in their attempt to combine ambivalent attitudes toward American politics and their own cultural capital originating from networks with roots in the United States. This resulted in both an emphasis on separating different appearances of what 'America' meant and emphasizing the cosmopolitan nature of their backgrounds. However, as one of my informants said, this was sometimes a 'schizophrenic' situation, which was rife with failures as much as successes. The contemporary making and remaking of these intellectual traditions remind us about the historical works that went into producing 'the globe' over the course of the twentieth century.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unlikely collaborations between American missionaries, philanthropists, and politicians gave rise to a separation between culture and political and economic interests. This modernizing culture lost its roots in the United States and became global through a widespread but fragile set of networks, which needed constant intervention and redefining to survive. The process continued with more overt participation of the US government during the Cold War period when, again, the separation of different images of the United States were articulated and used by seemingly apolitical networks, supported by funds linked to the US government. During this period of large foundations inherited from earlier missionary societies, welfare worked both at home and abroad – this is now called development projects. This was also the period when notions of expertise were defined in particular ways that transcended national borders. A global knowledge was made possible.

This article has proposed that we understand from concepts such as global and transnational the processes continually in the making in the dialogues and relations between those who claim these attributes and who support these claims. It emphasized the importance of paying attention to how separations between culture and politics, knowledge and ideology were created historically. Taking relevant networks in the Middle Eastern context, it attempted to show the immense work that went into sustaining such seemingly natural appearances. Focusing on the Middle East had the additional advantage of locating the difficulty and the unresolved nature of this work in the contemporary context. ‘The global’ knowledge construction seemed to have its doubts in the very networks supposed to advocate them.

## Notes

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43. Freely, *A History of Robert College*, p.226.
44. See for the friendship between the two and Howard Bliss at the Paris Conference, Penrose, *That They May Have Life*, pp.97, 108, 166, and Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*, pp.155, 172–6, 181.
45. See Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, pp.163–4. Their findings, after visiting the area from June to August 1919, indicated that populations of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine wanted a greater Syria, under the rule of an Arab leader. The commission also advised against the idea of a Jewish homeland and called for the restriction of Jewish migration to Palestine. The findings of this report were never published. They also surveyed Armenians in the Anatolian provinces. In the end they recommended a separate Armenia, and international Constantinople, and a Turkish state, all to be American mandates. The report was not published until December 1922. See for the original document W. Laquer and B.M. Rubin, *The Israel–Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), pp.23–5.
46. Kaplan, *The Arabists*, pp.68–71.
47. Gates, *Not to Me Only*, pp.287–9.
48. *Ibid.*, pp.295–6.
49. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, pp.273–8.
50. Makdisi, ‘Reclaiming the Land of the Bible’.
51. M. El-Shakry, ‘The Gospel of Science and American Evangelism in late Ottoman Beirut’, *Past and Present*, Vol. 196, No. 1 (2007), pp. 173–214.
52. Quoted from the *Foreign Missionary* 371 (1878) in Makdisi, ‘Reclaiming the Land of the Bible’, p.709.
53. Vitalis, *America’s Kingdom*.
54. E. Doumato, ‘Extra Legible Illustration of Christian Faith: Medicine, Medical Ethics, and Missionaries in the Arabian Gulf’, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, Vol.13 (2002).
55. Incidentally, when the 50 member states of the United Nations met in San Francisco to draw up the UN Charter, 22 of the delegates present were graduates of RC and AUB, two of the institutions whose establishment was explored in the previous section. Furthermore, AUB held the record for being the alma mater of the largest number of representatives.
56. Rosenberg and Foner, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp.204–5.
57. F.S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 2000), p.97.
58. V.R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.148–9.
59. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p.97.
60. There have been numerous studies done on the Congress of Cultural Freedom. See for discussions of its links with the CIA, Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars*, and Saunders, *The Cultural Cold*, and for discussions situating it in the context of a rising American empire, D. Pease and A. Kaplan (eds.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991) and N.P. Singh, ‘Culture Wars: Recoding Empire in an Age of Democracy’, *American Quarterly*, Vol.50, No.3 (1998), pp.471–522.
61. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, pp.71–106.
62. *Ibid.*, pp.125–8.
63. For a fascinating account of this web of relations, see *ibid.*
64. Among the activities of CCF outside of Europe were programmes in the Middle East. Although more limited in scope, there were the publications of *Hiwar* and *Adwa* until the CIA scandal erupted. *Hiwar*’s politics were low key but still attacked by Communists, Baathists, and Nasserites. Youssef Idriss, the celebrated Egyptian author of *The Sinners* had to turn down an award given by *Hiwar* due to these criticisms. The congress also ran a small bureau in Beirut to organize seminars and lectures and to distribute publications. See P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York and London: Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1989), pp.275–6 and 189–90.
65. J.C.E. Gienow-Hecht, ‘Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War – A Critical Review’, *Diplomatic History*, Vol.24, No.3 (2000), pp.470–71.

66. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, p.155.
67. Freely, *A History of Robert College*, p.102.
68. Calculated from *ibid.*, pp.117–20 and Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, p.238.
69. Freely, *A History of Robert College*, p.130.
70. *Ibid.*, p.131.
71. *Ibid.*, p.135.
72. M. Fincanci, *The Story of Robert College Old and New* (Istanbul: Alumni Association of the American Colleges of Istanbul, 1983), p.33.
73. Freely, *A History of Robert College*, pp.145–50.
74. See for a history of the period, E. Picard, *Lebanon, A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), pp.44–8.
75. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, pp.241–3.
76. See for the Ford and Rockefeller grants of the period, Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, pp.242–5.
77. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East*, p.243.
78. See for a documentation of the USAID funding in the budget of the university N.G. Khalaf, *The Economics of the American University of Beirut: A Study of a Private University in the Developing World* (Beirut: The American University of Beirut Press, 1977), pp.37–47 and 90–91.
79. S. Farsoun, 'Student Protests and the Coming Crisis in Lebanon', *MERIP Reports*, Vol.19 (1973), p.9.
80. Murphy, *The American University in Cairo*, p.96.
81. See Kaplan, *The Arabists*, p.77; and Vitalis, *America's Kingdom*.
82. Murphy, *The American University in Cairo*, pp.98–100.
83. *Ibid.*, p.145.
84. *Ibid.*, p.156.
85. *Ibid.*, pp.135–41.
86. *Ibid.*, pp.145–9.
87. *Ibid.*, p.171.
88. *Ibid.*, pp.114–15, 128–9.
89. *Ibid.*, p.182.
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91. Murphy, *The American University in Cairo*, p.176.
92. *Ibid.*, p.177.
93. *Ibid.*, pp.182–3.
94. *Ibid.*, pp.181–5.
95. *Ibid.*, pp.200–202.
96. See Y. Dezalay and B.G. Garth, *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002); and *idem*, *Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).
97. E.N. Sayah, 'The American University of Beirut and Its Educational Activities in Lebanon, 1920–1967' (Ph.D. thesis, University of North Texas, 1988), pp.173–4.
98. Interview with the author, Beirut, 6 April 2004.
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100. F. Colonna, 'Educating Conformity in French Colonial Algeria', in F. Cooper and Ann L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp.346–70.
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110. Grewal, *Transnational America*, p.14.
111. Ibid.
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115. See the US Department of Homeland Security webpage, which provides statistics for a variety of immigration procedures: <http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/YrBk04En.htm> (last visited 8 Feb. 2006).
116. See <http://egypt.usembassy.gov/consular/niv10.htm> (last visited 8 Feb. 2006).
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118. 22 Oct. 2003, Cairo.

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