

countries—including Saudi Arabia—have also recently made overseas investments in land and agricultural outputs to reduce risks of future food shortages, thereby importing more “virtual water” as a response to domestic water deficits.

Subsidies on water, food, and energy are props for regime legitimacy in the absence of democratic will-formation, but are throwing up fiscal challenges even for the Gulf countries. Modest regional investments in renewable energy are less a climate change mitigation measure and more an attempt, for fossil fuel exporting countries, to increase earnings from external oil and gas sales by reducing the role of these energy sources in domestic consumption: 97 percent of regional electricity is generated from fossil fuels. Swain and Jägerskog identify major geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges arising from the discovery and growing extraction of major natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. Natural gas generally has a lower life cycle global warming potential than coal and oil, but any climate change benefits may, the authors claim, be overwhelmed by the increasing demand for electricity (from population growth) and lower energy prices.

Given the environmental vulnerabilities addressed in the book, the authors foresee efficient (and I would add “equitable”) management of natural resources as providing conditions for stable and sustainable peace. In part, this is a matter of shared threats fostering information sharing and trust building: “The serious threat of climate change makes a strong case for increasing regional cooperation in the environment and development sectors” (p. 177). And there is an expectation that this could generate positive spillovers in addressing other security threats, although this may seem disconnected from the bloody violence and barbarism gripping much of the region. Yet Swain and Jägerskog are surely right to call, at least, for discussion of the contours of an integrated security approach, informed by a regional agenda promoting sustainable economic development and internal democratization. As they note, the realpolitik perspective underpinning the interventions of external actors—including the United States, European Union, and Russia—has so demonstrably failed the people of the region.

SENEM ASLAN, *Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Pp. 249. \$95.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781107054608.

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Why has there been a violent conflict and “a confrontational relationship” between Turkey’s Kurdish minority and the state, while “an uneasy accommodation” and “a relatively peaceful” relation has developed between Moroccan Berbers and their state (pp. 2, 92)? Senem Aslan’s timely analysis notes that this question is especially interesting because Kurds in Turkey and Berbers in Morocco shared many features when their states embarked on policies of state-led modernization. Their similarities, such as inaccessible geographies, tribal social structures, “distinct cultures” (p. 11), and capacity for violence rendered them potential “areas of dissidence” (p. 5). They thus posed similar challenges to their respective “state rulers [who both engaged] in centralizing their states and creating a national identity.” Given these initial similarities, why did these two cases evolve differently?

The answers that Aslan provides stem from an in-depth look into processes such as state-making—while simultaneously paying due attention to identities and ideologies—where politics and power take center stage, in order to better understand both ethnic–regional conflicts and state-making. Aslan highlights the ability of states outside western Europe to generate *sui generis* strategies of modern state-formation such as Morocco’s “neopatrimonial” model. They

transcend binary distinctions such as unitary versus federal and mononational versus multinational statehoods. Aslan maintains that each of these categories can coexist with a variety of different state–ethnic group relations. For example, not every (unitary) state-centralization would produce ethnic regional conflict. Furthermore, she shows that nation-making and state-making are not always mutually supportive processes. For instance, coercive and rigid nation-building policies weakened state authority and legitimacy in the Kurdish areas.

According to Aslan, the crucial policies shaping state–ethnic relations are a state’s “everyday intrusiveness,” that is: the extent to which a state interferes in the private sphere of the individuals that it aims to transform; the comprehensiveness of nation-building policies, meaning the extent to which a state seeks a wide range of changes in (people’s) behavior, values, habits, and lifestyles; and which agents implement these policies, who is allowed to act as intermediary between state and society. She also argues, but does not elaborate, that the impact on state–ethnic relations may to a great extent depend on what kind of power state elites use during these processes, for example, despotic versus infrastructural power à la Michael Mann. To understand why different states adopt different strategies of state-making, one must turn to variables such as degree of state autonomy from social centers of power and intraelite politics of gaining legitimacy and supremacy.

Elite power struggles in the early years of state-formation produced different winners and losers and, thus, different approaches to state- and nation-building in Turkey and Morocco. In Morocco, the king sidelined the Independence Party (IP; Hizb Al-Istiqlal) and consolidated the power of the monarchy by coopting Berber dissidence and tribal leaders. In Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (RPP; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) founded a republic by prevailing over the sultan; it then established a single-party regime by suppressing and taking advantage of Kurdish dissidence.

The RPP and IP had similar visions of how to establish state authority in tribal areas but had different capabilities. The RPP built on the strong and centralizing Ottoman state legacy, and harbored a relatively cohesive organization and, having led the war of independence, strong popular legitimacy. It benefited from the political skills of Kemal (later Atatürk), who gradually emerged as a hegemonic leader, and the sultan’s weakened legitimacy due to his partial support for semicolonization. By comparison, the IP lacked a strong state tradition and the legitimacy, leadership, and organizational unity of the RPP, while Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef eventually emerged as “the symbol of Moroccan nationalism” (p. 82).

Thus, the state’s direct rule was established over Berber society by the king’s integration of Berber notables into his political and administrative network, while the Turkish Republic tried to institute direct rule by oppressing Kurdish notables through agents autonomous from the Kurdish regions. Kemalists then launched socially transformative projects interfering with how people dressed, named their children, practiced religion, married, wrote, and talked. The government tried to force Kurds to speak Turkish and forget Kurdish, and Aslan’s research on the memoirs of state agents suggests that their motivation was *not only* linguistic nationalism, but also, at least partly, their will, and need—given the elimination of Kurdish intermediaries—to have a medium of communication with Kurdish citizens. The state also imposed a monolingually and monoculturally defined national identity of Turkishness and suppressed “overemphasis” on Islam.

By comparison, while the Moroccan state tried to create a strong, unitary state and national identity, it did so with relatively less interference in people’s private lives and by leaving local Berber power structures intact. Rural leaders were seen as allies, and, “unlike in Turkey, where the state elite saw detribalization as an indispensable component of state-building, in Morocco tribes were officially recognized” (p. 98). To be sure, Morocco did not become ethnically neutral and inclusive. Berber identity and culture lacked any official recognition and support, and the Arabic ideology and Arabic language and culture were privileged in society and politics. But the state did not meddle with everyday Berber cultural expressions and the monarch defined the national identity in deliberately vague and flexible terms, emphasizing shared symbols and traditions.

In both cases, new and more popular forms of Kurdish and Amazighen activism emerged in later periods. In Turkey, state oppression and Kurdish intransigence have interacted to generate a protracted violent conflict between the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan [PKK]) and the state. This conflict makes it unlikely that recent improvements in the cultural realm can suffice to bring peace without a political settlement. In Morocco, the monarchy continued with its long-term strategy of cooptation and accommodation, which included most notably the recent institutional recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic. Though remaining intolerant of Amazigh political dissent and not having resolved the Berber question, Morocco avoided major radicalization and violent conflict.

Aslan notes the tradeoffs between the relative peace that the Moroccan path enabled and state capacity in other areas. Morocco ranks quite low in human development indicators compared to Turkey and the king's alliance with rural notables contributed to "socio-economic stasis in the countryside" and curtailed the incentives for a state-led development agenda (p. 100). One might add that until recently Turkey had been much more "democratic" compared to Morocco, at least based on conventional, procedural definitions.

A major, unexplored difference between the two cases is that Berbers form a much larger share of Morocco's population (40%–45%) than Kurds do in Turkey (8%–10% in 1927 but currently 17%–20%). Hence, Turkey's intrusive policies would have been less possible in Morocco. The book also downplays the causal roles played by critical junctures, such as the division of former "Ottoman" Kurds—who had been part of the nationalist struggle—between the Republic of Turkey and the present states of Iraq and Syria in 1925–26. Had all former Ottoman Kurdish territories remained within Turkey, Kurds would have made up a much greater portion of Turkey's population. Hence, as I argued in *Milada Dönüş* (Return to Point Zero) (Istanbul: Koç University Press, 2016), Turkey's subsequent policies of suppressing Kurdish notables and of limiting public as well as private expressions of Kurdishness would have become less feasible and less likely. A related factor is that the real possibility of pan-Kurdish nationalism and secessionism significantly influenced state policies. This effect seems to have been much more subdued in the Moroccan case.

Aslan's book presents an even-handed and elegant analysis, and a much-needed, comparative and theory-informed contribution. It is highly recommended for anyone interested in Turkey and Morocco or in state-making, nation-making, and state-ethnic relations in general.

MISAGH PARSA, *Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016). Pp. 406. \$45.00 cloth. ISBN: 9780674545045

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One of the more curious developments of the 2009 uprising popularly known as the Green Movement was the government show trial in which, among many others, Max Weber was indicted for sedition against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Other than showcasing the totalitarian paranoia of the regime, the purpose of this exercise was not immediately clear, nor was it immediately apparent that the prosecutors had a good handle on the clear and present danger of Weber's ideas. Regime anxiety extended to any thinker cited by the opposition, and the Islamic Republic was not alone in seeking to deconstruct the intellectual foundations of their rivals. The precise method was nonetheless somewhat clumsy and undoubtedly counterproductive.

Weber's crime was to have been co-opted and written into the constitution of the leading reformist organization, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami).